Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

Rune Midjord

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

Rune Midjord

Department of Economics

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents’ preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.

Original language	English
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	119
Issue number	3
Pages (from-to)	261–263
Number of pages	3
ISSN	0165-1765
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028
Publication status	Published - Jun 2013

Keywords

Faculty of Social Sciences
Full implementation
Direct mechanism
Verifiable information
Rank-order tournaments

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

Cite this

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title = "Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes",

abstract = "A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents{\textquoteright} preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.",

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author = "Rune Midjord",

note = "JEL classification: D82",

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AB - A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents’ preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Full implementation

KW - Direct mechanism

KW - Verifiable information

KW - Rank-order tournaments

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.02.028

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 119

SP - 261

EP - 263

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 3

ER -

Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

Abstract

Keywords

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