Abstract
Current discussions on social cognition, empathy, and interpersonal understanding are largely built on the question of how we recognize and access particular mental states of others. Mental states have been treated as temporally individuated, momentary or temporally narrow unities that can be grasped at one go. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition—on Stein and Husserl in particular—I will problematize this approach, and argue that the other’s experiential states can appear meaningful to us only they are viewed in connection with further, non-simultaneous experiential states of the other. I will focus on the temporal structure of mental states which has received less attention in the available literature. Building a comparison between empathy and music perception, I will argue that approaching the problem of other minds from the point of view of particular mental states is like considering music from the point of view of particular notes.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Human Studies |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Pages (from-to) | 463-479 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISSN | 0163-8548 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2015 |