An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour

TY - CHAP

T1 - An account of Boeschian cooperative behaviour

AU - Blomberg, Olle

PY - 2015/9/1

Y1 - 2015/9/1

N2 - According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn’t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.

AB - According to reductionist accounts, intentional joint action can be exhaustively analysed with concepts that are already available and anyway needed for understanding intentional singular action. Most such accounts include a condition that it must be common knowledge between the participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that causes and coordinates the joint action (a CK-condition). Without such common knowledge, the resulting joint action supposedly isn’t an intentional joint action. I argue that reductionists should reject the CK-condition. Either the CK-condition is unnecessary or else the reductionist fails to account for the target phenomenon of intentional joint action.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-15515-9_9

M3 - Book chapter

SN - 978-3-319-15514-2

T3 - Philosophical Studies Series

SP - 169

EP - 184

BT - Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems

A2 - Misselhorn, Catrin

PB - Springer

CY - Cham

ER -