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A Montero auction mechanism for regulating unobserved use of the commons
Lars Gårn Hansen
Section for Environment and Natural Resources
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Dive into the research topics of 'A Montero auction mechanism for regulating unobserved use of the commons'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Business & Economics
Auctions
77%
Collusion
32%
Common Resources
82%
Disadvantage
25%
Exit
33%
Externalities
26%
Firm Resources
35%
Incentives
31%
License
88%
Resource Use
100%
Strategic Behavior
32%
Tax
39%
Tax Enforcement
44%