Abstract
I argue against the view that an agent’s knowledge of her own current action cannot in any way rely on perception for its justification. Instead, I argue that when it comes to an agent’s knowledge of her own object-oriented intentional action, the agent’s belief about what she is doing is partly justified by her perception of the object of action. I proceed by first proposing an account of such actions according to which the agent’s knowledge is partly justified by her perception. I then discuss several of objections to my proposal. The most important objection is that I have only managed to show that perception plays an enabling role and not a justificatory role for the agent’s knowledge of her own intentional action
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Tidsskrift | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research |
| Vol/bind | 86 |
| Udgave nummer | 2 |
| Sider (fra-til) | 295-318 |
| Antal sider | 24 |
| ISSN | 0031-8205 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - mar. 2013 |
Emneord
- Det Humanistiske Fakultet
- philosophy of action
- intention
- knowledge of Action
- demonstratives
- attention