Abstract
This paper considers a congested bottleneck. A fast lane reserves a more than proportional share of capacity to a designated group of travelers. Travelers are otherwise identical and other travelers can use the reserved capacity when it would otherwise be idle. The paper shows that such a fast lane is always Pareto improving under Nash equilibrium in arrival times at the bottleneck and inelastic demand. It can replicate the arrival schedule and queueing outcomes of a toll that optimally charges a constant toll during part of the demand peak. Within some bounds, the fast lane scheme is still welfare improving when demand is elastic.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Transportation Research Part B: Methodological |
Vol/bind | 45 |
Udgave nummer | 6 |
Sider (fra-til) | 845-851 |
Antal sider | 7 |
ISSN | 0191-2615 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - jul. 2011 |