Give and Take in Dictator Games

Alexander W. Cappelen; Ulrik Haagen Nielsen; Erik Ø. Sørensen; Bertil Tungodden; Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030

Give and Take in Dictator Games

Alexander W. Cappelen, Ulrik Haagen Nielsen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden, Jean-Robert Karl Tyran

Økonomisk Institut

41 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Economics Letters
Vol/bind	118
Udgave nummer	2
Sider (fra-til)	280–283
Antal sider	4
ISSN	0165-1765
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030
Status	Udgivet - feb. 2013

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keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Dictator game, Choice set, Social preferences, Experiments",

author = "Cappelen, {Alexander W.} and Nielsen, {Ulrik Haagen} and S{\o}rensen, {Erik {\O}.} and Bertil Tungodden and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl}",

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T1 - Give and Take in Dictator Games

AU - Cappelen, Alexander W.

AU - Nielsen, Ulrik Haagen

AU - Sørensen, Erik Ø.

AU - Tungodden, Bertil

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

N1 - JEL classification: C91; D63

PY - 2013/2

Y1 - 2013/2

N2 - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

AB - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Dictator game

KW - Choice set

KW - Social preferences

KW - Experiments

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 118

SP - 280

EP - 283

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -

Give and Take in Dictator Games

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