Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes

Rune Midjord

1 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

A manager/mechanism designer must allocate a set of money prizes ($1,$2,…,$n) between n agents working in a team. The agents know the state, i.e., who contributed most, second most, etc. The agents’ preferences over prizes are state independent. We incorporate the possibility that the manager knows the state with a tiny probability and present a simple mechanism that uniquely awards prizes that respect the true state.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TidsskriftEconomics Letters
Vol/bind119
Udgave nummer3
Sider (fra-til) 261–263
Antal sider3
ISSN0165-1765
DOI
StatusUdgivet - jun. 2013

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