Dicisigns and Cognition:  The logical interpretation of the ventral-dorsal split in animal perception

Frederik Stjernfelt

doi:10.1515/cogsem-2014-0004

Dicisigns and Cognition: The logical interpretation of the ventral-dorsal split in animal perception

Frederik Stjernfelt

Institut for Kunst- og Kulturvidenskab

Abstract

The paper is a critical investigation of the linguist James Hurford's bold proposal that animal cognition conforms to basic logical structure-particularly striking in the ventral-dorsal split of visual perception. The overall argument is that dorsal processing of visual information isolates the subject of a simple, perceptual proposition, while ventral processing addresses the corresponding predicate aspect-the two indicating and categorizing the object of perception, respectively. The paper investigates some of the problems in Hurford's interpretation-particularly his refusal of animal proto-language to have anything corresponding to constants or proper names and his idea that all such propositions must be monovalent only (and thus not addressing relations). As an alternative to Hurford's psychological interpretation of Frege for his logical basis, Peirce's theory of propositions-so-called "Dicisigns"-is proposed.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Cognitive Semiotics
Vol/bind	7
Udgave nummer	1
Sider (fra-til)	61-82
Antal sider	22
ISSN	1662-1425
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1515/cogsem-2014-0004
Status	Udgivet - 1 maj 2014

Emneord

Det Humanistiske Fakultet

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10.1515/cogsem-2014-0004

Citationsformater

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keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Semiotics , Cognition, Philosophy, Neuroscience, Proposition, Dicisign, Vision, Ventral-Dorsal",

author = "Frederik Stjernfelt",

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doi = "10.1515/cogsem-2014-0004",

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T1 - Dicisigns and Cognition

T2 - The logical interpretation of the ventral-dorsal split in animal perception

AU - Stjernfelt, Frederik

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N2 - The paper is a critical investigation of the linguist James Hurford's bold proposal that animal cognition conforms to basic logical structure-particularly striking in the ventral-dorsal split of visual perception. The overall argument is that dorsal processing of visual information isolates the subject of a simple, perceptual proposition, while ventral processing addresses the corresponding predicate aspect-the two indicating and categorizing the object of perception, respectively. The paper investigates some of the problems in Hurford's interpretation-particularly his refusal of animal proto-language to have anything corresponding to constants or proper names and his idea that all such propositions must be monovalent only (and thus not addressing relations). As an alternative to Hurford's psychological interpretation of Frege for his logical basis, Peirce's theory of propositions-so-called "Dicisigns"-is proposed.

AB - The paper is a critical investigation of the linguist James Hurford's bold proposal that animal cognition conforms to basic logical structure-particularly striking in the ventral-dorsal split of visual perception. The overall argument is that dorsal processing of visual information isolates the subject of a simple, perceptual proposition, while ventral processing addresses the corresponding predicate aspect-the two indicating and categorizing the object of perception, respectively. The paper investigates some of the problems in Hurford's interpretation-particularly his refusal of animal proto-language to have anything corresponding to constants or proper names and his idea that all such propositions must be monovalent only (and thus not addressing relations). As an alternative to Hurford's psychological interpretation of Frege for his logical basis, Peirce's theory of propositions-so-called "Dicisigns"-is proposed.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Semiotics

KW - Cognition

KW - Philosophy

KW - Neuroscience

KW - Proposition

KW - Dicisign

KW - Vision

KW - Ventral-Dorsal

U2 - 10.1515/cogsem-2014-0004

DO - 10.1515/cogsem-2014-0004

M3 - Journal article

SN - 1662-1425

VL - 7

SP - 61

EP - 82

JO - Cognitive Semiotics

JF - Cognitive Semiotics

IS - 1

ER -

Dicisigns and Cognition: The logical interpretation of the ventral-dorsal split in animal perception

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