Budget institutions and taxation

Lasse Aaskoven

doi:10.1007/s11127-018-0507-7

Budget institutions and taxation

Lasse Aaskoven

1 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Public Choice
Vol/bind	174
Udgave nummer	3-4
Sider (fra-til)	335-349
ISSN	0048-5829
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0507-7
Status	Udgivet - 1 mar. 2018

Emneord

Det Samfundsvidenskabelige Fakultet

Adgang til dokumentet

10.1007/s11127-018-0507-7

Citationsformater

@article{77671eb0b49b4b069973aa4b85eaadfd,

title = "Budget institutions and taxation",

abstract = "While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.",

keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Fiscal institutions, Budget centralization, Taxation, common-pool problem",

author = "Lasse Aaskoven",

year = "2018",

month = mar,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/s11127-018-0507-7",

language = "English",

volume = "174",

pages = "335--349",

journal = "Public Choice",

issn = "0048-5829",

publisher = "Springer",

number = "3-4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Budget institutions and taxation

AU - Aaskoven, Lasse

PY - 2018/3/1

Y1 - 2018/3/1

N2 - While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.

AB - While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Fiscal institutions

KW - Budget centralization

KW - Taxation

KW - common-pool problem

U2 - 10.1007/s11127-018-0507-7

DO - 10.1007/s11127-018-0507-7

M3 - Journal article

SN - 0048-5829

VL - 174

SP - 335

EP - 349

JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

IS - 3-4

ER -

Budget institutions and taxation

Abstract

Emneord

Adgang til dokumentet

Fingeraftryk

Citationsformater