Ability Theories of Practice and Turner’s Criticism of Bourdieu

Julie Zahle

doi:10.1007/s10838-016-9355-7

Ability Theories of Practice and Turner’s Criticism of Bourdieu

Julie Zahle

Institut for Kommunikation

1 Citationer (Scopus)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in this process, to defend Pierre Bourdieu’s ability theory against Stephen Turner’s objections. In part I, I outline ability theorists’ conception of practices together with their objections to claims about rule following and rule explanations. In part II, I turn to the question of what ability theorists take to be the alternative to rule following and rule explanations. Ability theorists have offered, and been ascribed, somewhat different answers to this question, just as their replies, or positive accounts, have been heavily criticized by Turner. Due to this state of the debate, I focus on the positive account advanced by a single—and highly famous—ability theorist of practice, Pierre Bourdieu. Moreover, I show that despite Turner’s claims to the contrary, his arguments do not refute Bourdieu’s positive account.

Originalsprog	Engelsk
Tidsskrift	Journal for General Philosophy of Science
Vol/bind	48
Udgave nummer	4
Sider (fra-til)	553-567
Antal sider	15
ISSN	0925-4560
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9355-7
Status	Udgivet - 1 dec. 2017

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Citationsformater

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AB - The aim of this paper is to provide a characterization of ability theories of practice and, in this process, to defend Pierre Bourdieu’s ability theory against Stephen Turner’s objections. In part I, I outline ability theorists’ conception of practices together with their objections to claims about rule following and rule explanations. In part II, I turn to the question of what ability theorists take to be the alternative to rule following and rule explanations. Ability theorists have offered, and been ascribed, somewhat different answers to this question, just as their replies, or positive accounts, have been heavily criticized by Turner. Due to this state of the debate, I focus on the positive account advanced by a single—and highly famous—ability theorist of practice, Pierre Bourdieu. Moreover, I show that despite Turner’s claims to the contrary, his arguments do not refute Bourdieu’s positive account.

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KW - Abilities

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KW - Rules

KW - Tacit knowledge

KW - Theories of practice

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DO - 10.1007/s10838-016-9355-7

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Ability Theories of Practice and Turner’s Criticism of Bourdieu

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